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GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

TECHNOLOGY REGULATION BY DEFAULT:
PLATFORMS, PRIVACY, AND THE CFPB
Rory Van Loo*
CITE AS: 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 531 (2018)

INTRODUCTION
In the absence of a technology-focused regulator, diverse
administrative agencies have been forced to develop regulatory models for
governing their sphere of the data economy. These largely uncoordinated
efforts offer a laboratory of regulatory experimentation on governance
architecture. This symposium essay explores what the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) has done in its first several years to regulate
financial technology (“fintech”), in the context of broader technologyrelated concerns identified in the literature.
The CFPB offers an example of an agency that avoids some of the
major potential institutional challenges that other regulators might face:
susceptibility to capture, a lack of technological sophistication, and
insufficient authority. Launched in 2011 with a “technocratic impulse,”
the CFPB embraced its identity as a 21st century agency from the outset.1
It opened a Twitter account and hired a large number of computer
engineers before becoming operational, and has developed a suite of
online digital tools for consumers. Compared to the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), the CFPB has more authority to write rules, impose
civil penalties, and monitor what businesses are doing with algorithms. Its
funding is independent of congressional appropriations, and its director
can only be fired for cause. Granted, the CFPB has its own relative
limitations, including a long list of important, post-financial-crisis needs
waiting at its inception; strong political and industry resistance; and a
*

Associate Professor of Law, Boston University; Affiliated Fellow, Yale Law School
Information Society Project. For excellent research assistance, I am grateful to Daniela
Abadi, Phoebe Dantoin, Amy Mills, Thomas Perkins, and Kelsey Sullivan. The author
was on the implementation team that set up the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
All information below is based on publicly available sources.
1
K. Sabeel Rahman, Envisioning the Regulatory State: Technocracy, Democracy, and
Institutional Experimentation in the 2010 Financial Reform and Oil Spill Statutes, 48
HARV. J. LEGIS. 555, 557 (2011).
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mission focused only on finance. The agency nonetheless offers a window
into how a powerful, independent, and technologically savvy agency
might regulate the data economy.
The body of this essay begins with a survey of what the CFPB has
undertaken using more traditional administrative agency tools—
enforcement and rulemaking—in areas such as privacy, consumer control
over data, and regulatory sandboxes. It then looks at how the CFPB has
used technology to protect consumers, through Twitter and online
advisory tools. The essay closes by considering open questions, including
the possibility of the CFPB’s privacy activities extending its oversight of
tech giants like Facebook and Amazon, and the extent to which the CFPB
might exercise additional authority to inspect financial algorithms. More
systematic study of the agency’s activities is needed, but the CFPB’s early
experiences both provide examples that other agencies might follow and
indicate the difficulty of relying on industry-specific regulators to govern
the data economy, rather than an agency focused on technology.
I. CFPB ENFORCEMENT AND POLICYMAKING FOCUSED ON TECHNOLOGY
In advancing its core consumer finance mission through
enforcement and rulemaking, the CFPB has engaged with the data
economy in a number of ways. Its enforcement actions have required it to
look at how financial entities are using social media and algorithms to sell
to consumers. The agency has become active in enforcing privacy matters.
It has also taken steps toward improving data portability principles and
building a regulatory sandbox.
A. Traditional Consumer Finance Violations
The CFPB has pursued enforcement actions against fintech
companies with innovative business models, ranging from Paypal to small
startups. It issued a consent decree against one online lender, Think
Finance, whose computer system had automatically debited borrowers’
accounts for payments that they did not legally owe and issued debt
collection emails urging similar payments.2 In a separate action, the CFPB

2

Complaint at 12-13, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Think Fin., LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19480 (D. Mont. Nov. 15, 2017) (No. 4:17-cv-00127-BMM) [hereinafter Think
Fin. Complaint].
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fined LendUp $3.6 million for deceptive practices including understating
the annual percentage rate (APR).3
Several inferences can be made from these cases. First, the CFPB
is paying attention to social media. In its case against LendUp, the agency
took issue with Facebook ads. LendUp had paid for “slider bars” on
Facebook pages that users could move horizontally to gauge how payment
terms would change at varying amounts and times. The CFPB found that
those slider bars did not disclose the full APR and how the loan terms
might change later.4 Exactly how the CFPB learned of this type of
violation is unclear, but the agency has shown some willingness to hold
new digital forms of advertisement to traditional standards.
At a more theoretical level, the CFPB’s activities show the
importance of code in the regulatory analysis. Think Finance, for instance,
was selling loans online that had been originated by three other businesses,
collectively referred to in the legal complaint as “Tribal lenders.” 5 The
Tribal lenders provided key data inputs for the algorithm that Think
Finance used to assign risk scores to consumers and to decide what risk
score (the output) it would accept. The CFPB nonetheless decided that
Think Finance’s control of the algorithm meant that it “controlled the
Tribal lenders and ran the business.”6
Part of the reasoning was that Think Finance refused to share the
inner workings of the algorithm with the Tribal lenders. For the CFPB, it
was not enough that another entity supplied the base product and made
key decisions about the inputs and outputs. Even in finance, an industry
defined by money, it is not necessarily the party owning the funds that has
the power in a business partnership, but may instead be the party that
controls the algorithmic “black box.”7
B. Data Security
The CFPB took its first serious enforcement step into data security
in 2016. The agency found that Dwolla, a money transfer platform like
Venmo, had engaged in deceptive practices when Dwolla told its
3

Consent Order at 7, Flurish, Inc d/b/a LendUp, CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0023 (Sept. 27,
2016).
4
Id.
5
Think Fin. Complaint, supra note 2, at 9.
6
Id.
7
See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (Harv. Univ. Press ed., 2015).
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customers that its data security protocol “surpass[ed] industry security
standards.”8 In reality, as stated in the consent order, Dwolla “failed to
employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect data obtained from
consumers from unauthorized access.”9
It is difficult to know how far the CFPB will take its data security
operations. It is worth noting, however, that the FTC today “is viewed as
the de facto federal data protection authority.”10 It began paying close
attention to this area in the 1990s.11 But the FTC did not need to receive
any additional authority from Congress to ramp up its privacy enforcement
significantly.12 Instead, it mostly used its basic unfair and deceptive acts
authority it had received in the early 1900s.13 In other words, in becoming
the de facto federal data protection authority, the FTC used authority that
the CFPB has in consumer finance. Particularly given the political
pressures on the CFPB and the broader political support for data security
(a politically safe area of enforcement), it is possible that the CFPB will
pay greater attention to this area in the future.
C. Data Portability
Congress has mandated that the CFPB study how best to regulate
the sharing of information between financial institutions and third parties
when consumers authorize access. The issue is particularly important in
light of the potential next generation of fintech platforms. Platforms such
as Mint and Credit Karma have sought to analyze all credit card, bank
account, and loan offerings to tell consumers when they should switch.
Since credit is so personalized—dependent on spending patterns and FICO
scores and other customer-specific features—advisory fintechs must have
access to consumers’ private data to provide the best advice. Banks have
put up obstacles to third-party access, thereby threatening to enfeeble
fintech advisors.14

8

Consent Order at 5, Dwolla, Inc., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0007 (Mar. 2, 2016)
[hereinafter Dwolla Consent Order].
9
Id. at 6.
10
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600 (2014).
11
See id. at 598-600.
12
See id. at 604-05 (noting that the FTC gained increasing regulatory power by slowly
acquiring enforcement authority over federal privacy statutes).
13
Id. at 599.
14
See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L. J. 1267, 1286 (2017).
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The CFPB, after studying the matter, issued a set of principles to
serve as guidelines for the sharing of data, including that financial
institutions should generally not prevent consumers from granting access
to account information.15 When sharing happens, the regulated entity is
advised to ensure that the data transfer is secure.
The CFPB’s approach to data protection did not go as far as it
could have because it declined to write formal rules. The extent to which
its principles serve as de facto rules can be debated, but the agency
emphasized that the principles were not interpretations and did not reflect
future enforcement priorities.16
The risk here is that banks and other financial institutions have too
much leverage. With voluntary principles, banks have more leeway to
erect barriers to data access. As a general matter, financial institutions
serving customers have an incentive to limit third-party access, which
makes their data more valuable. The CFPB’s decision to opt for voluntary
compliance also means that fintechs must negotiate with banks to obtain
the data access they need to help consumers. Although in theory banks
should treat all third parties similarly, they have an incentive only to work
with third parties that are not driving banks’ customers away. Fintechs that
are dependent on financial institutions’ voluntary cooperation are
presumably less likely to recommend that consumers move to other banks
and credit card companies, even if doing so would be in the consumers’
best interests. Stated otherwise, the CFPB’s approach increases the
chances that fintechs must serve banks rather than only consumers.
By way of contrast, European authorities have required banks to
give third parties far-reaching access to data upon consumer
authorization.17 Fintech advisors in Europe will thus have greater ability to
analyze consumers’ spending habits and credit profiles to provide helpful
recommendations.
In the Bureau’s defense, it was an odd choice by Congress to task
the CFPB with studying the issue of data access. In Europe, the issue of
15

See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER PROTECTION PRINCIPLES: CONSUMERAUTHORIZED
FINANCIAL
DATA
SHARING
AND
AGGREGATION
(2017),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-protection-principles_dataaggregation.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE9Q-P79E].
16
See id.
17
EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., REPORT ON INNOVATIVE USES OF CONSUMER DATA BY
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
6
(2017),
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1720738/Report+on+Innovative+uses+of+
data+2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY98-FF2U].
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data access was put in the hands of a regulator with competition authority.
The CFPB does not have a traditional competition mandate.
The choice of the CFPB, and its reluctance to push further,
arguably reflects a design flaw in the financial regulatory architecture. As
I have argued elsewhere, no agency has the right motivation, expertise,
and authority to advance competition policy in consumer finance.18 The
DOJ’s antitrust division has some responsibility for competition
enforcement in finance, but lacks rulemaking authority, has no real
finance-specific expertise, and defers to banking regulators. The banking
regulators, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),
have as their primary mission ensuring that big banks do not fail. That
mission is in tension with helping fintechs advise consumers that better
deals may lie elsewhere.19
The CFPB was perhaps the best choice available in a regulatory
structure that has a glaring hole for competition enforcement. Its handling
of the data portability issue further underscores the importance of data
economy regulators committed to promoting not just consumer protection,
but also competition.20
D. Regulatory Sandbox
Regulatory sandboxes aim to support innovation by enabling
businesses to test new ideas in close communication with a regulator. To
support fintech innovation, the CFPB launched Project Catalyst in 2016.
This program’s goal is to ease concerns among startups that the CFPB
might take enforcement actions in response to some new product or
practice. To ease such potentially innovation-deterring concerns, the
CFPB allows companies to ask for a no-action letter. Under this program,
the CFPB would review a proposed technology and issue a letter stating its
intent not to take an enforcement action.21

18

See Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65
UCLA L. REV. 1 (2017).
19
See id.
20
This is a project attracting the attention of many scholars. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan,
Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (2017); K. Sabeel Rahman,
Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age:
Towards A Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1347 (2016).
21
Policy on No-Action Letters; Information Collection, 81 Fed. Reg. 8,686, 8,692-93
(Feb. 22, 2016).
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In its two years of existence, the program has only led to one noaction letter.22 It is difficult to know how to interpret this lack of industry
interest in the no-action letters. One possible explanation for these results
could be a poorly designed program. For example, some have argued that
the no-action letter provides insufficient legal protections and imposes
burdensome information sharing.23 Another possible explanation is simply
that startups are not worried about CFPB action against their new
products.24 Still, the CFPB’s initiation of the program is a potential first
step toward a broader experimentalist framework with stakeholder
involvement from the technology sector.25
II. CFPB USE OF TECHNOLOGY TOOLS
The CFPB has used technologies to interface with consumers in a
number of ways. It has built a suite of online tools that help consumers to
make decisions. Consumers can also go to the CFPB’s website to submit
complaints about financial institutions, and the agency has regularly
tweeted to consumers, sometimes even in response to particular financial
institutions’ behavior.
A. Online Decision Tools
The CFPB has begun to offer a suite of online decision assistants.
At the agency’s mortgage calculator website, for instance, people can
enter a zip code, loan amount, and credit score to learn the interest rates
that similarly situated borrowers paid for their mortgages. Through this
mortgage calculator, the CFPB is offering services close to what a fintech
startup might. It purchases the data it uses from private parties. For-profit
companies, such as Quicken Loans, offer a variety of mortgage calculatortype tools.26 Many of the private sector tools go further by listing actual
products available and seeking to complete the purchase. But even the
22

Eric Mogilniki & Michael Nonaka, CFPB Has Opportunity to Reinvent Approach to
Innovation,
AMERICAN
BANKER
(Feb.
21,
2018,
9:30
AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cfpb-has-opportunity-to-reinvent-approach-toinnovation [https://perma.cc/9ZG9-ZURR].
23
See, e.g., id.
24
This possibility is consistent with the CFPB’s reluctance to pursue new types of digital
harm. See infra Part III.A.
25
On the broader role of sandboxes in fintech, see, e.g., Christopher G. Bradley,
Fintech’s Double Edges, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 85-86 (2018).
26
See id.
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basic step of providing price information before the purchase is unusual
for a government entity.
Another way of conceptualizing the CFPB’s online offerings is as
creating a digital regulator. These tools aim to help consumers protect
themselves by making better decisions. Markets with informed consumers
are, in theory, better able to self-regulate.
As I have described in greater depth elsewhere, the CFPB’s
entrance into the realm of Internet intermediaries raises questions about
the evolving role of the regulatory state in the information age.27 How
effective can the tools be given that the CFPB puts a tiny fraction of the
resources into its mortgage calculator compared to private mortgage
calculators? Should the writing of these tools’ computer code count as a
kind of legal rulemaking, and thus go through notice and comment
processes as some agencies have done with their online tools?28
B. The Complaint Database
The CFPB hosts an online complaint database through which
consumers can submit problems they have encountered with financial
institutions.29 A consumer complaint database is not new. The FTC, for
instance, has had its own consumer complaint tool for years. Both
agencies use the complaints to detect violations. But the CFPB has gone
farther than the FTC by forwarding complaints to the relevant institutions,
and tracking whether a complaint was dealt with. The CFPB follows a
model closer to that of the OCC, which contacts the institution on the
complainer’s behalf and later sends a summary report of the results.30
The one way in which the CFPB appears to have gone farther than
its peer regulators is by publishing complaint data online. Anyone can
view which companies have been subjected to CFPB complaints, read the
complaint language, and even download complaint data for analysis.
Industry fought this publication strenuously, but lost. As a result, the
database arguably has a shaming component, or at least provides some

27

See Van Loo, supra note 18.
See id.
29
See Jean Braucher & Angela Littwin, Examination As A Method of Consumer
Protection, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 33, 70 (2016) (describing the CFPB’s complaint database).
30
Office of Comptroller of the Currency, What You Can Expect From Us,
HELPWITHMYBANK.GOV,
https://www.helpwithmybank.gov/complaints/what-toexpect/complaints-what-to-expect.html [https://perma.cc/GGB7-N4H3].
28
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public transparency that contrasts with the confidential nature of other
regulators’ complaint databases.
Like with its mortgage calculator, the complaint database is
another area where the CFPB is offering an online tool that, to some
extent, competes with the private sector. The many websites that allow
consumers to rate and complain about firms may not forward on their
complaints and receive responses with the same impact. But unlike in
other industries, consumers have a choice of publicly venting their finance
grievances on either a private or a governmental online platform.
C. Twitter Outreach
The CFPB, like many agencies, has used Twitter as an outreach
tool. It opened an account in January of 2011, several months before the
agency’s official launch, and has since then tweeted over 3,000 times.
Most of its tweets are educational, providing links and tips about choosing
a mortgage, dealing with debt collectors, or talking to children about
finance.31
The agency has not generally used the account to call out specific
companies. But it has, at times, gently mentioned some by name in the
process of delivering an educational message, or to inform consumers how
they can seek redress. In many identity theft protection tweets following
the Equifax breach, for instance, it mentioned Equifax, TransUnion, and
Experian a number of times in describing how those companies share
people’s data.32 After reaching settlements with companies, the CFPB has
also tweeted links and messages to let consumers know that they may be
eligible for payments.33 When consumers tag the CFPB while criticizing a

31

See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@consumerfinance.gov), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/CFPB [https://perma.cc/P4AD-KC4R].
32
See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@consumerfinance.gov), TWITTER (Feb. 1,
2018, 11:00 AM), https://twitter.com/CFPB/status/959139289031413761 (mentioning
that the list of credit reporting companies goes beyond Equifax, TransUnion, and
Experian) [https://perma.cc/JB9W-GPPJ].
33
See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@consumerfinance.gov), TWITTER (Mar. 18,
2018, 8:54 AM), https://twitter.com/CFPB/status/973950383667195905 (tweeting to
RushCard users that they may be eligible for redress payments from the company);
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@consumerfinance.gov), TWITTER (Sept. 15, 2017, 7:35
AM), https://twitter.com/CFPB/status/908700698962944000 (linking resources for
participants in Morgan Drexen’s illegal debt relief scheme) [https://perma.cc/G2P8HT7T].
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business, which happens regularly, the CFPB usually responds by
referring the user to the agency’s complaint database or phone hotline.34
A rare tweet that came close to confrontational, but still could be
considered educational, was a CFPB response to a Super Bowl
commercial by Quicken Loans. The commercial advertised a new app,
Rocket Mortgage, which aimed to streamline the home-buying process.
The commercial ended with a simple summary of its aspirations: “PUSH
BUTTON, GET MORTGAGE.”35 Within minutes of the commercial, the
CFPB had tweeted its advice to “know before you owe,” and provided a
link to the CFPB’s own suite of decision-aiding mortgage tools, without
mentioning any company’s name. Quicken Loans shortly thereafter
tweeted back: “@CFPB We agree. No better way than #RocketMortgage
for full transparency into mortgage options & info needed to make the
right decision.”36 The CFPB did not respond.
To provide some perspective on the CFPB’s Twitter usage, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has tweeted about 2.8 times
per day since it joined in 2008, almost twice as much as the CFPB’s rate.
Moreover, the CFPB has not been particularly successful in attracting
followers, with its 81,000 followers amounting to about one third as many
as the SEC. As another data point, the FTC tweets considerably more than
both of the others combined, at about 6.4 times per day. But the FTC has
the least number of followers of these agencies, with about 55,000.37
~

~

~

Of course, this snapshot of the CFPB’s online tools cannot fully
assess their effectiveness. It is difficult to know the extent to which the
CFPB’s tweets, mortgage calculator, and complaint database help cut
34

See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@consumerfinance.gov), TWITTER (May 7,
2018,
12:28
PM)
https://twitter.com/CFPB/status/993527892339503104
[https://perma.cc/N7G7-Z24W].
35
Quicken Loans, Rocket Mortgage Super Bowl Ad 2016 Quicken Loans, YOUTUBE (Feb.
8, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nXW2BJixXfw [https://perma.cc/QG8475EL].
36
Quicken Loans (@QuickenLoans), TWITTER (Feb. 8, 2016, 8:27 AM),
https://twitter.com/quickenloans/status/696732072761815040 [https://perma.cc/RX5G885E].
37
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (@consumerfinance.gov), TWITTER, supra note 31; FTC
(@FTC), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/FTC [https://perma.cc/X2TY-SKQ9]; SEC
(@SEC_Enforcement),
Twitter,
https://twitter.com/sec_enforcement
[https://perma.cc/X29R-BK5B]. Note that these figures do not account for any deleted
tweets.
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through—rather than contribute to—the infoglut.38 Still, these activities
offer at least two takeaways. First, despite being unusually well positioned
to regulate in the information age, the CFPB has not been particularly
active, compared to other business regulators, in deploying information
technologies—with the possible exception of publishing its complaint
database online. Second, the CFPB’s early experiences demonstrate how
regulators are increasingly utilizing their own digital tools to influence
consumer decisions.
III. OPEN QUESTIONS FOR CFPB GOVERNANCE OF FINTECH
Regulators inevitably must decide how to deploy limited resources
in the face of sometimes questionable jurisdiction. The CFPB has so far
demonstrated limited appetite for bringing cases and monitoring subtler
digital harms. The extent of its authority over companies at the fringes of
consumer finance also remains unclear.
A. Regulating Seduction by Algorithm
Scholars have shown how firms can exploit consumer psychology
to increase the prices that consumers pay for various products, such as
mortgages, credit cards, and cell phones.39 Firms can strategically
structure their pricing packages with a large number of variables, such as
data usage, fees, and teaser rates. Due to psychological tendencies and the
limits of the human brain, this complexity causes consumers to make
errors in identifying the best choice for them among available options.40
Firms can engage in a similar kind of “seduction by algorithm.”41
Tactics include burying the best deal low on a long list of search results;
not permitting the user to order results based on unit pricing; and
displaying a price in the search results that is lower than the price that
most people ultimately pay for normal sizes and colors of that item.42
38

On the regulatory problem of infoglut in the information age, see Julie E. Cohen, The
Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369, 370-73
(2016).
39
See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY
IN CONSUMER MARKETS (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2012).
40
See id.
41
See Van Loo, supra note 18, at 1272.
42
See Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1311 (2015) (reviewing practices used by Amazon); Van Loo,
supra note 18 (reviewing the empirical literature).
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These strategies relate to a broader set of concerns about technologically
mediated bias.43
Through its enforcement actions, the CFPB has yet to demonstrate
a willingness to police these subtler digital tactics. It has not hesitated to
look at advanced computer modeling when doing so is necessary to
carrying out its mandate. One of its early enforcement actions dealt with
bias in a bank’s decision-making model for credit scoring.44 For newer
digital harms, however, the CFPB has instead stayed closer to a more
cautious “consumer protection paradigm of notice and choice.”45
B. Inspection of Algorithms
One of the frequent calls in the literature on governance of
platforms is for greater visibility into the inner workings of algorithms.46
The CFPB has the clear statutory authority to examine financial
institutions’ non-public data, even without suspecting any wrongdoing,
through its supervision group.47 Supervision is a separate office from
enforcement at the CFPB. It conducts regular audits of companies, called
examinations, to check what they are doing. Examiners collect
information remotely, but also spend a large amount of time onsite,
sometimes for months at a time at the largest banks.48
This routine process allows the CFPB examiners to look at a large
variety of information sources. Most importantly for present purposes,
their examination manual specifies that examiners can review “computer
program and system details.”49 The CFPB’s examination activities are less
43

See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 100712 (2014); James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV.
1, 20 (2007).
44
In the Matter of American Express Centurion Bank, CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0002, (Oct.
1, 2012).
45
Cf. Cohen, supra note 38, at 386 (“[C]urrent consumer protection paradigms framed in
terms of notice and choice are ill-suited to address these issues, which are fundamentally
issues of economic and social inclusion.”); supra Part I.A.
46
See, e.g., id. at 373 (“[P]olicymakers must devise ways of enabling regulators to
evaluate algorithmically-embedded controls.”); Van Loo, supra note 42, at 1385
(recommending that the FTC examine the results of some big data analyses).
47
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5321,
5322(a)(2), 5491(a) (2012).
48
See Van Loo, supra note 42, at 1311 (discussing supervision and examination
functions at the CFPB and contrasting them to the FTC approach).
49
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL
(Aug.
2017),
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publicly visible than its formal legal actions, but they publish summary
highlights several times a year.50
A review of these highlight reports indicates that examinations
sometimes unearth problems in regulated entities’ source code. For
instance, the agency discovered that “one or more credit card issuers”
violated disclosure requirements on the forms provided at account
opening. The report explains that management concluded an employee had
incorrectly entered the source code used to generate the standardized
forms.51 In other words, once a problem is spotted the examiners rely on
the company to conduct an internal review of its computer systems.52
There is less evidence that the CFPB looks at code or algorithms as
a regular part of its exams, as it does with various business records. In the
most recent year of highlights available, 2017, there is no mention of such
activities.53 It is possible that algorithmic inspections have simply not
made it into the reports. Regardless, if the CFPB is not already
undertaking such analyses on its own, its leadership could change that
policy decision at any point.
C. Jurisdiction Over Other Platforms
Another open question for the bureau is the breadth of institutions
that it oversees. Its authorizing statute gives it broad oversight of entities
selling consumer financial products, such that any business providing a
consumer financial product or service, or any affiliate of such a business,
is covered.54 CFPB enforcement authority clearly reaches most of the
fintech sector, although its supervision authority is more constrained,
requiring a formal rulemaking process to examine new entities not on its
original list.55 Fintechs offering solely advice could try to argue that they
do not fall under the agency’s jurisdiction since they are only offering free
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information, although that argument is unlikely to persuade given the
broad statutory language.
The CFPB’s authority may even reach parts of major companies
who have developed payment systems, such as Apple, Amazon, and
Facebook. CFPB jurisdiction over these companies would not
immediately extend to non-financial matters, such as how platforms
censor online content or advertise deceptively. Given the CFPB’s recent
entrance into data security, however, it is possible that in at least some
areas the CFBP’s ability to monitor could extend into non-financial parts
of online platforms. Once a platform has taken in consumer financial data,
the company’s overall data security practices would arguably be relevant
to any determination of whether Apple, Amazon, or Facebook sufficiently
safeguard the financial data they collect. Given the FTC’s role in privacy,
the CFPB would be faced with a potential jurisdiction clash along the lines
of what some scholars predict will become increasingly common in a
world in which software infuses most everything.56 Additionally, if
fintechs sell customer information to third parties, the CFPB could impose
requirements on how those third parties use that information indirectly, by
holding the entity that the CFPB regulates—the fintech or bank—
accountable for what the third party does with the information.
CONCLUSION
The CFPB is a rare agency that can inspect important algorithms in
the information age—those in the consumer financial realm. It has already
undertaken enforcement actions against online consumer financial
platforms in data security and deceptive practices. And it has analyzed an
early generation of algorithmic offline harms—bias from credit scoring
models. At the same time, the CFPB has not yet used its authority to
pursue the next generation of platform issues that legal scholars have been
writing about for years, nor does it appear to inspect source code on a
regular basis.
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The CFPB’s early technology activities may look quite different
from its future. The agency began with a full slate of new rules that it was
required by statute to write. It also had to build a new program for
supervising a vast sea of financial institutions, some of which the federal
government had never supervised. These responsibilities may simply have
left the agency with insufficient capacity to push further in digital
oversight. The CFPB’s early activities could mark the first steps in a larger
evolution needed to address the “existential challenges for regulatory
models and constructs developed in the context of the industrial
economy.”57
On the other hand, the task of regulating consumer financial firms,
ranging from dispersed payday lenders to the world’s largest banks, may
prove too consuming for the agency to develop cutting-edge algorithmic
oversight simultaneously. The CFPB’s light treading so far may have been
wise, keeping it from overbearing regulatory mistakes that would have
harmed innovation and consumers. Without evidence that avoidance of
cutting-edge issues was the result of a deliberate analysis, however, the
agency’s record indicates the potential value of a technology-focused
regulator, a kind of meta-agency that would help other agencies, such as
the CFPB and FTC, to adapt to subtler algorithmic and platform
challenges.58 Regardless, the agency’s early activities contribute to the
laboratory of administrative experiments, worthy of study for lessons
learned and elements of a working blueprint for a broader information age
regulatory architecture.
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